With this varied experience of regional and political norms, Baker had a basis upon which to judge the island territory, and he wrote a set of three articles for the American Magazine in 1911-1912.12 The specific call that sent him to Hawai'i came from a friend in the WestWilliam Kent, a Progressive Republican elected to Congress from Marin County, California, in 1910. Kent suggested that Baker go to Hawai'i, where he would see the "growth of cold selfish commercialism." Exactly why Kent was so concerned with Hawai'i is unclear. He had visited the islands in 1907, and the Big Five's Crockett, California, refinery was near his Marin County congressional district. Kent was also a close ally of San Francisco reformer Rudolph Spreckels, a son of Claus Spreckels. Thus, it is likely that he was familiar with the western sugar industry in both its California and Hawaiian phases. Whatever Kent's concerns, Baker found his call a welcome winter respite from New England and departed for the islands in February 1911.13 Baker arrived at a particularly auspicious time: the Big Five had only recently consolidated their hold on the sugar industry. U. S. Commissioner of Labor, whom Baker cited, noted in a 1911 report: "The past five years have witnessed an increasing centralization of this (the sugar) industry; large plantations have been combined into still larger plantations; sugar-factor firms, which represent the center of financial control, are fewer but stronger than in 1905;... and steamship lines to the mainland are more closely allied than ever with sugar factors and planters."14
The Big Five's consolidation initially appealed to Baker's Progressive instincts for efficiency and for local, rather than absentee, control. He was impressed with the high level of scientific management in the Hawaiian sugar industry, which he called "farming with brains" and "almost unbelievable to a person accustomed to ordinary farming methods of the middle West." Baker applauded the Big Five for throwing off the control of the California "sugar trust" that was "robbing them." For Baker the Big Five had shown "unusual ability in overcoming the disadvantages of distance and the rigors of world competition." Such ability had the beneficent result that profits from the sugar industry returned to Hawai' i, though Baker noted that those profits still resulted from a tariff protection against foreign sugar that no true Progressive could condone. 15 Having linked Hawai'i to the California sugar industry and praised its modern farming methods, Baker might have gone on to describe the islands as one of the most efficient parts of the American West. But other aspects of island life forced him to withhold any "western" label and to reach for other regional comparisons. In Baker's eyes the power of the Big Five was based on a land and labor system that was not democratic and hence not like a western-style homesteading democracy to which he constantly alluded.
The mainland journalist explained that three-fourths of the population had no say in the government because the Chinese and Japanese labor force was disenfranchised. Baker did not blame the voteless status of the Asians on the Big Five. The prohibition of naturalization for Asian immigrants emanated from national policy endorsed by most western Progressives, including Baker and William Kent. Baker fully condoned the restrictions on Chinese and Japanese entry to the U. S. that had been demanded by what he called the "democracy of the Pacific Coast": white working men. For the journalist, the Big Five's anti-democratic act was in bringing voteless Asians to work in Hawai'i, thus preventing mainland Caucasian workers from migrating to the islands. Baker even went so far as to blame the Big Five for forcing mainland taxpayers to support costly defense fortifications in Hawai' i, necessitated by the international tensions that immigration restriction caused between the U. S. and China/ Japan. 16 The Progressive journalist despised "cheap" Asian labor, which he claimed made "democratic citizenship impossible." This "peasant" labor force precluded Hawai'i from being part of a homesteading democracy and prompted Baker's continual comparisons to the American South, particularly the South before the Civil War. "The white laboring class of citizens," he explained, "disappears before the Oriental influx in Hawaii just as poor whites before the war fled from the Negro." For Baker, a western-style democracy-before and after the war-was characterized by free, landowning, voting, white farmers.'7
Baker's analysis of the lack of democracy in Hawai'i and the Big Five's culpability had even more twists and turs. The disenfranchisement of the Asians did not result in a Caucasian majority in the electorate of the territory. Caucasians comprised only 16 Baker, "How King Sugar Rules," 32, 35-6; Ray Stannard Baker, "Human Nature in Hawaii: How the Few Want the Many to Work for Them-Perpetually, and at Low Wages," American Magazine 73 (January 1912), 328-9.
In arriving at his three-fourths voteless estimate Baker noted that one-half of Hawai'i's population was Chinese and Japanese with the other one-quarter being composed of "peasant" Europeans (Portuguese, Spanish, Russian) who were not yet naturalized.
Immigrant Asians were excluded from naturalization by a federal law dating to the 1790s. Chinese Exclusion Acts, based on West Coast demands, had been passed in 1882, 1892, and 1902. Restriction on Japanese entry to the United States was reached in Theodore Roosevelt's 1907-1908 series of notes to the Japanese emperor known as the Gentlemen's Agreement, which restricted the immigration of male workers, but not females. For the best background on anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese restrictions based on West Coast demands, see Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850 (Seattle, 1988). 17 Baker, "How King Sugar Rules," 36. Baker did not define the "West" or use the term in the way he used "Old South" or New England. However, his constant reference to an ideal model of a homesteading democracy of white citizen settlers strikes me, and I would imagine most readers, as having a regional home in the American Midwest. Thus, I have characterized Baker's "homesteading democracy" as a western or western-style ideal. about four thousand of the islands' 14,442 registered voters in 1910. The vast majority, some ten thousand, were native Hawaiians, who participated actively in politics. But according to Baker, they were controlled by the whites who "flattered" them with luaus, divided them into three political parties, and created public jobs for them. He was equally critical of the Hawaiians for allowing themselves to be controlled. (Baker leaves the reader to ponder if Hawaiian voters, free from Big Five influence, would somehow have proposed and voted for land and labor policies that would have encouraged more whites to migrate from the mainland.) He also rebuked the Hawaiians because they were not small landholding farmers. Instead, those who owned land tended to rent plots to hardworking Asians who had left the sugar plantations. Caucasian planters, Hawaiian rentiers, and Asian workers had one thing in common: they did not work the land they owned, the precondition in Baker's mind for a true western democracy. Instead, life in Hawai'i was "very much as it was in the South before the war."18 Baker believed that white farmers were eager to migrate to Hawai'i and realize his dream of a homesteading democracy. He devoted great attention and sympathy to a group of 20 homesteaders led by J. E. Gamalielson, a Swedish-American farmer who came to Hawai'i in the 1890s to grow sugar cane on a small landholding. Having built a cooperative sugar mill themselves, the farmers were subsequently "flattered" by the owners of a large plantation when they offered use of the plantation mill. Later the plantation failed to give the homesteaders what they thought their sugar was worth; bankruptcy was the end result. By 1910, only three of the 20 homesteaders were still farming. Six or seven sold out to the plantation, and the rest rented their land to Japanese workers who were able to make money by raising cane and selling it to the plantation. At every turn a combination of white planters and Asian workers thwarted the dream of the white homesteaders! A democratic Hawai'i could result only from increased homesteading legislation that favored the citizen settler. Baker praised territorial governor Walter Frear for proposing such laws to the U. S. Congress. Baker, "The Land and the Landless," 206-9, 214. Though Baker was most interested in the Swedish-American farmer, two-thirds of the 20 homesteaders were Portuguese, the class Baker had earlier called "peasants." In addition to the prices paid at the plantation mill, Baker also criticized the Big Five's relation to small farmers for the classically anti-Progressive measures of high charges for the sea and land transport within Hawai'i and for withholding use of private wharfage facilities.
Though the Big Five foiled the dreams of white homesteaders, Baker was nonetheless attracted by the level of community philanthropy practiced by members of the Caucasian elite. The Big Five's reinvestment of profits extended from their businesses to the community. Some of the rich, he noted, gave 40-60 percent of their income to charity with the result that "[c]olleges, kindergartens, churches, missions and social settlements flourish there with unexampled vigor." The YMCA was able to raise $143,000 in six days. Trying to reconcile the dichotomies of island life, Baker concluded, "I have rarely visited any place where there was as much charity and as little democracy as in Hawaii." Though subsequent writers quoted this line as if it had been a criticism of planter paternalism, Baker genuinely applauded the charity. To his Progressive mind this showed an admirable concern for the welfare of the population that was often lacking among business interests on the mainland. Baker might well have found Hawai'i a true western paradise had the level of democracy matched the level of charity.20
Baker's positive feeling toward such "good works" led him to divide the planter/ business elite into two groups: 1) those who focused solely on profits and showed little interest in a wider democracy and 2) those who were in favor of more democracy (including more white farmers), more educational facilities, and a more inclusive franchise, including local-born Asians who would become voters in the next decades. Into the former group Baker placed some of the planters whom the Big Five had recently displaced-and who had returned to England, Germany, and San Francisco. In the latter group Baker put those of "missionary descent" who were born in the islands and "raised in modest homes." To Baker they had "become aristocrats not with entire comfort" who still retained an old democratic "New England conscience." Despite all of his regional comparisons to the South, Baker still found in Hawai'i the New England he revered.21
In his third and final article, published in January 1912, Baker once again voiced his criticism of "Oriental" labor and his lament for the plight of the free white worker. But in the final pages of the piece, he seemed to succumb to the lure of the islands and the Progressive benevolence of the white business elite. Though he found the current condition of the public schools "overcrowded," he noted that "these abuses are already being recognized by the progressive and far-sighted people of the islands. Baker's fascination with island life even prompted him to foresee the outlines of democracy in the island's Asian population. At the end of his last article he focused on the Japanese immigrants, who he now described as "so irresistibly industrious and progressive." He noted their control of fishing and vegetable raising and praised the fact that many were "becoming merchants, bankers and professional men." He cited the substantial growth in Japanese property ownership as a positive sign and looked forward to the day when the Nisei (Hawai'i-born second generation) would come of voting age. The journalist's sudden democratic vision for the islands did not sit well with his mainland Progressive audience, most of whom saw no chance for Asian assimilation or Americanization. One of his most avid readers, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote him that Oriental exclusion should continue to be the major national policy. Rudin told the committee he opposed statehood because of the "unhealthy control" of the Big Five. He explained that the Big Five operated a system of spying, coercion, and intimidation to force workers to vote for Republican candidates and to advocate statehood. Democratic candidates, he claimed, were not allowed to campaign on certain plantations. However, when members of the committee asked Rudin to cite specific names of people who had intimidated employees, his answers were vague. When asked if the manager of Waialua plantation had threatened or intimidated him, Rudin responded, "He would not intimidate me. John Midkiff is more broadminded than most managers." Rudin also admitted that plantation manager Midkiff allowed Democratic candidates to appear at Waialua, but that managers on other plantations were not so "broad." Though Rudin may well have expected the Democratic congressmen to be sympathetic to him, they instead responded that the stability and prosperity to Hawai' i's companies and its workers, as well as tax revenues for public services. Hawai'i had experienced only mild economic disruption during the depression of the previous decade. Shoemaker also dispelled the mainland myth that Hawai'i's prosperity was based on "cheap Oriental labor," an image that had lingered since Baker's day. Hawai'i's plantation workers were financially better off than mainland agricultural workers and less prone to seasonal unemployment. The "economic security of the average plantation worker in Hawaii," Shoemaker explained, "is far greater than that of the farm or plantation worker on the mainland." For Shoemaker such economic prosperity and security, however, came at the price of personal independence or what Baker would have called "democracy."40
The lack of personal independence was endemic to the very structure of the central unit in the sugar industry-the plantation. The plantation had been a vital instrument in expanding the sugar industry to arid lands that had not previously been used for any form of agriculture. But unlike a rural market town or independent farming community, it had not fostered civic growth. The plantation, as a community, was totally owned by the plantation company. It was a "small world in itself' where "anyone on any part of the plantation is a trespasser unless he has the permission of the management to be there." Not only did the plantation world inhibit union development, it inhibited the rise of small independently owned businesses as well as participation in any form of local government. As Shoemaker explained, "[t]he complete dependence of employees upon the plantation in respect to every aspect of the life of the working community makes them less independent than farm laborers on the mainland."41 For Shoemaker, the paternalistic plantation had been a vital engine of economic expansion that no longer had a future because the labor force was increasingly a "citizen labor force" of Hawai' i-born workers trained in American democratic ideals by the tax-supported public schools of the territory. Possibly the only aspect of plantation life that was not company owned were the schools. Shoemaker went into some detail on this new "citizen labor force" drawn from the children of Asian immigrants, particularly Japanese. It comprised only 12 percent of the labor force in 1930, but 41 percent by 1939. The economist noted that seminars held with Hawai'i-born Japanese and Chinese students revealed that most would not accept the plantation life of their parents. They wanted increased occupational opportunity-and occupational opportunity in Hawai'i. Whereas first generation workers at the turn of the century often returned to their homeland or migrated to the mainland, both options were effectively closed to the second generation. Japanese-Americans found themselves unwelcome in Japan. Hostile attitudes toward Asians on the U. S. mainland as well as unemployment on the Pacific Coast blocked any desire of Hawai'i's Nisei to migrate east.
Shoemaker made it clear that the Big Five would in some way have to adapt the sugar industry to the new citizen labor force.42
One of those ways would be acceptance of a rise in the power of labor, most likely signified by an increase in union activity as well as more highly skilled or professional plantation jobs that appealed to educated workers. Shoemaker was blunt in noting the unorganized state of labor versus the highly organized state of management. Even by 1939, "less than one twenty-fifth" of the territory's labor force was organized and most of that organization had come in the last few years. Management, he noted, had a long history of "antagonism to labor organization" and was basically "anti-union." But for Shoemaker the rising tide of citizen labor was a force to which the Big Five would have to adapt. Hawai'i's future-both for management and labor-was dependent on such an adaptation.43
Shoemaker's analysis of territorial Hawai'i, though dry when compared to Baker's "feudal barons," was insightful. The concentrated power of the Big Five's sugar world had brought prosperity and stability to the entire population of the islands and a level of public services, particularly exemplified by the schools, that had produced the ideals, confidence, and demands of the rapidly emerging citizen labor force. But the Big Five's power had also curbed certain avenues for citizen participation. While federal law had curbed the avenue of voting and political participation, Big Five policy had limited union participation, and the very organization of the plantation had stunted personal independence. In 1939, Hawai'i was all at once an economically prosperous, but politically underdeveloped, community.
Shoemaker's 1939 analysis was re-emphasized in 1940 with the publication of the Eagen Report, though the latter was rhetorically more strident and decidedly anti-Big Five. Edward Eagen, an NLRB field representative in Seattle, had come to Hawai'i in 1937 to investigate unfair labor practices by the Big Five. He was not concerned with the overall structure of Hawaiian industry. Like Shoemaker, Eagen emphasized that the second-generation work force, educated in the public schools of the territory, was not content with the paternalistic welfare of the old plantation. Union organization and participation, not simply higher wages, were demanded by the new generation of workers, if they were to accept plantation work at all. His expectation that union organization would grow in the islands was far gloomier than Shoemaker predicted. He emphasized the "anti-unionism" of the Big Five and detailed the level of Big Five control. Virtually everything in the territory from sugar plantations and shipping, to the press, to the courts, and even to the U. S. Army and Navy, was under the thumb of the sugar factors. Eagen singled out Frank E. Thompson Even the global military experience of the Nisei in World War II was one bounded and conditioned by mainland laws. Whereas soldiers from mainland states served in a wide assortment of units during the war, Hawai'i's Nisei soldiers were bound in two units, the 100th and 442d. They fought the war together and then they returned to Hawai'i to lead the "democratic saga" together. The 100th Club and the 442d Club, which served both as social clubs and arenas for political activity, kept the solidarity of those bounded veterans alive for decades after the war.
Within this bounded pre-war community moved the Big Five and the haole business community. On the surface it may appear that the various boundaries of territorial life primarily circumscribed the lives and activities of "locals." Much of the pre-and post-war Big Five critique asserts that the Big Five created those bounds. But were the Big Five not also conditioned by those externally imposed boundaries of the pre-war community? How did they react to those boundaries? Given their local power were they able to change those external boundaries or were they forced to accept them?
In the economic sphere the most obvious of the territory's boundaries that affected the Big Five was the California sugar industry, dominated by Claus Spreckels. Prior to 1898, the Hawaiian sugar industry was an economic colony of San Francisco. The public school system of territorial Hawai'i fueled by those taxes, as well as the philanthropically supported private schools, was central to the life of the bounded community. It was the locus and focus of civic participation and occupational ambition for the children of the disenfranchised work force, both in urban and rural settings. As such, it has attracted considerable attention and controversy from historians. Where did the Big Five stand on support of the school system? As in so many island controversies, the picture is clouded. On the one hand, the acknowledged quality of the school system and the level of tax support would suggest that the elite supported it. If they controlled the territorial legislature, surely they controlled the level of tax support. On the other hand, comments from HSPA representatives opposing "too much education given to children of lowly birth" can be cited as an indication that the planters wanted to undercut such democratic and occupational ambitions. Where then do all the sagas and observations leave us in our understanding of the last territory to join the federal union? Economically, socially, and politically, territorial Hawai'i was a community characterized by a wide set of boundaries that circumscribed the labor mobility and political activity of the haves as well as of the have-nots. Presiding over this bounded community was the Big Five, perennially one of the most observed, awed, and categorized oligarchies in twentieth-century America. Throughout the century, they have been called many things-southern, colonial, feudal, semi-feudal, and outmoded. By the century's end they had survived most of the labels, but their territorial legacy remains difficult to grasp. Just what were the Big Five and the territorial community like? Were they possibly "western" or "progressive," two labels that are rarely subscribed to the Big Five or pre-war Hawai'i? While those adjectives may be as elusive to define and describe as the earlier labels, one thing seems clear: the bounded territorial community and conduct of the pre-war Big Five were definitely created and conditioned by the West. From the inner politics of the western sugar industry, to western demands for Asian immigration, to concerns for the military security of the Pacific Coast, western issues and prejudices shaped territorial Hawai'i. 
